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Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patient
Thomas S. Szasz, M.D.*

T

ROLE of the institutional psychiatrist-consisting on the one hand of being a therapist to his patient, and
on the other of being a protector of society against the patientis one of the major dilemmas facing contemporary psychiatry.'
While these two roles need not conflict in the case of every
patient, the possibility of ambiguity, conflict and attendant injury to the patient and to society is ever present in this arrangement. Once it is admitted that patient and mental hospital (or
hospital authorities) might come into conflict with each other, it
becomes necessary to try to avoid situations in which persons are
placed in the position of simultaneously representing opposing
interests.
It is a well-established principle of democratic forms of social
administration that situations of conflicting interests must not be
entrusted to single persons (or agencies). This precaution is
based on the premise that such arrangements are conducive to
surreptitious slighting of one or the other of the two interests.
It is believed, too, that reconciliation of the conflict by means of
an equitable compromise can be more readily achieved if each
interest has its own, separate and well-defined, representation.
There' is much empirical evidence in jurisprudence, politics,
psychiatry, sociology and everyday life to support this contention. It is also well known that should the conflicting interests
of two (or more) persons or parties be placed in the hands of a
single representative, some of those so represented very likely
will feel that they have been betrayed. Should this occur, the
injured party has no recourse for remedying the harm done to
him. Indeed, a person injured in this way is worse off than if
he had no representation at all, since in the latter case he could
avail himself of the requisite legal or perhaps legislative aid. But
this avenue is barred to those who, by official flat, are said to have
adequate legal (or other, e.g., psychiatric) representation, when
in fact they do not. It was shown elsewhere that mentally ill
hospitalized, often find
persons, especially those involuntarily
2
themselves exactly in this position.
HE DOUBLE

*Professor, Department of Psychiatry, State University of New York, Upstate Medical Center, Syracuse, New York.
1 I have discussed this problem in several previous papers to which the
interested reader is referred. E.g., see Szasz, Some Observations on the
Relationship between Psychiatry and the Law, 75 A. M. A. Arch. Neurol.
& Psychiat. 297 (March 1956); Psychiatric Expert Testimony: Its Covert
Meaning and Social Function, 20 Psychiatry 313 (August 1957); Psychiatry,
Ethics, and The Criminal Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev., 183 (1958).
2 Szasz, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: "Treatment" or Social Restraint?
125 J. Nerv. & Ment. Dis. 293 (April-June 1957); Civil Rights and The
Mentally Ill, to be published.
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The purpose of this essay is to amplify and illustrate this
thesis by means of a type of litigation characteristic of forensic
psychiatry. I refer to the legal contests resulting from the
patient's suit for release from the mental hospital against the
wishes of the hospital authorities; and also to its corollary,
namely, the hospital superintendent's suit against the patient
when the latter has gained his release by the decision of a lower
court and the former, seeking the continued retention of the
patient, appeals this decision.
The mere fact that a patient seeking release from a hospital
is denied his request should, I submit, be considered prima facie
evidence of a conflict of interests between himself and the hospital
authorities. To argue that the patient is "psychotic" (or insane,
deranged, etc.) will not do, even if it might, in some theoreticalpsychiatric sense, be correct. This argument must be expressly
disallowed simply because it rests on the wholly unwarranted
assumption that mentally ill persons (or some of them) have no
genuine ("rational") interests of their own, or if they have, they
do not know what they really are. It seems to me that we should
assiduously guard against temptations to make such assumptions.
For what is involved here is the adjudicationof the legitimacy of
interests (or desires, wishes, etc.), rather than their acknowledgment or description. So-called mentally ill persons, however deranged or different from those considered normal, obviously do
have desires and interests to do some things, and to avoid doing
some others. The same is true of children. Clearly, the most
honest thing possible in these situations is to acknowledge what
their interests are, and to state, equally explicitly, what ours are.
Should the two sets of interests conflict, this, too, must be explicitly acknowledged and dealt with, rather than obscured or
denied. It may be asked: How are we to ascertain the interests
of others? Our answer is that we must ascertain them the same
way as we determine our own. In both cases, at least as a base
line for further study and discussion, we must accept self-declared
intentions as phenomenologically valid and morally legitimate. To
argue that "mentally ill" persons do not know what their "real
interests" are-that is, "what is good for them"-makes the
speaker the self-appointed guardian of the patient's alleged best
interests, and thus puts an end to any inquiry into or discussion
3
of this problem.
Once the patient brings suit against the hospital superintendent (in his capacity as representative of the hospital), their
respective roles become legally defined as those of adversaries.
It is hard to see how anyone can maintain, in the face of such
evidence, that they could, nevertheless, be partners in working
toward the therapeutic rehabilitation of the patient. Yet this is
generally what the psychiatrists in these situations have claimed
and continue to claim. In a previous discussion of the civil rights
3 Szasz, Moral Conflict and Psychiatry. Yale Review, in press.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol9/iss2/4

2

9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)

May, 1960

of involuntarily hospitalized mental patients,4 I suggested that
the relationship of these patients to their psychiatrists is of an
adversary character and urged that this fact be more openly recognized and implemented. How such recognition and implementation might operate could probably be described better by using
actual case illustrations, rather than by stating it only in general
terms. To accomplish this, we shall briefly consider some examples.
The typical form of the type of litigation which we are considering is "John Doe (patient) v. John Smith (superintendent) ,"
when the patient sues for release; and its reverse, when the
mental hospital superintendent sues to reverse the decision of a
lower court ordering the patient's release. The literature on
forensic psychiatry is replete with such cases. The examples
which follow are condensed from Lebensohn's essay, Contributions of St. Elizabeth's Hospital To a Century of Medicolegal
Progress.5
Let us begin with the case of Barry v. White. 6 The patient,
Paul duV. Barry, sued William Alanson White, the superintendent
of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, for his release. Barry had been acquitted of a murder charge on the grounds of insanity and was subsequently committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. He filed three
writs of habeas corpus, and when all of these were denied, he
appealed the last ruling to a higher court.7 In their decision,
the appeal court ruled:
It seems clear that the natural assumption of fact follows that such condition of insanity has continued to the
present time. The effect of such presumption is to cast upon
the prisoner here the burden of proving that since the commission of the homicide he has become sane to the degree
that it is reasonably certain that his enlargement will now
be without menace to the public peace or safety. Where
insanity has gone so far as actually to take human life, no
4 Szasz, Civil Rights and The Mentally Ill, to be published.
5 Lebensohn, Contributions of St. Elizabeth's Hospital to a

Century of

Medicolegal Progress, 24 Med. Ann. Dist. Columbia 469, 542 (Sept. and
Oct. 1955).
6 62 U. S. App. D. C. 69 (1933).
7 It is important to note that often this type of litigation is complicated
and confused by the fact that the "patient" committed an unlawful act.
Thus, when he asks for release from the "hospital," the superintendent of
that institution tends naturally to assume the role of prison-warden (i.e.,
the role of being entrusted to keep the "patient" safely locked up). But
if this is so, surely he has asked to be so defined! Moreover, these quasicriminal cases have also served as models for the lawsuits of other mental
patients who have never committed an unlawful act. In their suits for
release, too, the superintendent is apt to take the role of warden. The concepts of criminality and mental illness thus remain persistently confused
and equated in the management of the (involuntarily) hospitalized mental
patient.
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sensible person will be satisfied with evidence of recovery
which does not attain to the degree of reasonable certainty.s
Lebensohn added: "It will be noted that the burden of
proving his recovery in such cases rests squarely on the shoulders
of the petitioner."
This situation deserves critical scrutiny. I shall limit myself
to only a few brief remarks.
1. How can a plaintiff-patient, in such a situation, prove his
so-called sanity, or recovery (from an alleged mental illness),
when the precise criteria of what constitutes mental illness has
never been clearly defined? This is an utterly Kafkaesque situation, requiring the defendant (as it were) to prove that he is innocent, without specifying the crime of which he is alleged to be
guilty.
2. If "insanity" was inferred directly from homicide, as seems
to have been the case here, "sanity" could be proved (logically)
only by guaranteeing the non-commission of future homicide.
But how can anyone prove a future occurrence? Surely, this is a
good example of a requirement which it is logically impossible to
fulfill.
3. Furthermore, how could the patient prove that he is "mentally healthy" without powerful psychiatric assistance, powerful
enough to counteract the prestige and authority of the hospital
superintendent? Without supplying him with psychiatric defense
-in addition to legal defense-he is, in fact, as good as unrepresented in his psychiatric battle with the experts. In support of
this contention, consider Dr. White's much poorer showing in his
forensic-psychiatric battle in the Leopold-Loeb case.' 0 In that
case, finding himself in the other corner, as it were, from the
power represented by the prosecution, he was unable to make his
"diagnoses" of "insanity" stick. It is evident that mental hospital
psychiatrists testifying against disenfranchised and feared mental
patients have the power of the state (and of public opinion) on
their side. If such matters are to be legally adjudicated, it is not
enough to go through the formalities of a judicial proceeding.
The ethic of democracy requires equal representation of the interests of the two parties.
There is an interesting postscript to the Barry case. After
approximately eleven years of hospitalization, Barry managed to
escape from St. Elizabeth's Hospital and make his way to St.
Louis. Although picked up by the police there, he was not returned to the District of Columbia, and no more was heard of
him. Mental hospitalization of this kind reminds one of the tales
s Lebensohn, op. cit. supra note 5, at 543.

9 Id.
10 W. White, The Autobiography of a Purpose (1938).
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of the Count of Monte Cristo: that is, of indefinite detention in
jails without possibilities of legal reprieve, intelligently conceived
and skillfully executed escape being the only means for gaining
one's freedom. But should we not ask why psychiatrists wish to
play wardens in such a system of unreasoning and unjust imprisonment? And if they really believe that Barry, or men like
him, should be segregated from society for virtually unlimited
periods of time, what training, skill or legal status do psychiatrists
possess to implement such "sentences"?
Let us briefly review another celebrated case, that of OverHolser v. DeMarcos.11 DeMarcos was from Tennessee, and while
living in Canada, was tried for murder and convicted of manslaughter. While serving his sentence for life imprisonment, he
was found to be of "unsound mind." He was sent to a mental
hospital in Canada, and then, in accordance with the "reciprocal
trade agreement" (as Lebensohn put it) between that country
and the United States, he was transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. This was in 1939, at which time DeMarcos was already 71
years old. At St. Elizabeth's Hospital he was diagnosed "as one
of the rare cases of true paranoia." 12 Between 1940 and 1944,
he made several unsuccessful attempts to gain his freedom by
filing four different writs of habeas corpus. In his fifth attempt,
"Justice Goldsborough took the case out of the hands of a jury
and summarily ordered him discharged . . . The apprehension

of the District Attorney's office at having DeMarcos at large"wrote Lebensohn-"was further evidenced by the unprecedented
speed with which the appeal was drawn and filed ....

This

was seen in some legal circles as an effort on the part of the District Attorney's office to 'get out from under' should anything
untoward happen involving the released man. The appeals court
ordered the arrest of DeMarcos, and this was interpreted as a
direct rebuke to the presiding judge. The wheels of justice
moved much too slowly in this instance, for by the time the order
for arrest was issued, DeMarcos was already in Knoxville. After
some delay, he was apprehended by 13the F. B. I. on an assault
charge and returned to the District.'
In Overholser v. DeMarcos, the Court of Appeals announced
the following decision (as abbreviated by Lebensohn):
It is not the function of the Judge in habeas corpus proceedings to determine the mental condition of a person who
has been committed for insanity... It should be remembered
that persons committed ..

. are presumed to be insane . . .

There is also a presumption that the hospital staff are competent ... and that their opinion is correct. Their determination that a petitioner should not be at large should not be
11 80 U. S. App. D. C. 91 (1945).
12 Lebensohn, op. cit. supra note 5, at 544.
13

Id. at 544-45.
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lightly disregarded .

.

. The issue which must ultimately be

decided is whether he has sufficiently recovered from a mental disease, so that he may be safely released. Lay judgment
on such an issue is of little value. If, despite the judgment of
the hospital staff that the petitioner has not recovered, there
is a substantial doubt on the question, it becomes the duty
of the court to see that a new judgment on the petitioner's
sanity is made according to the procedure laid down in the
District of Columbia code. This procedure requires an examination and report by the Commission on Mental Health
(italics added) .14
This, however, was not the end of the story. DeMarcos
seemed to be indestructible and forever hopeful. This is Lebensohn's account of the denouement of this story:
The Commission did, indeed, examine him on two separate occasions and concurred with the Hospital findings. In
spite of this, DeMarcos persisted, and in persisting he finally
triumphed. In 1946, at the time of his eighth try, he was 78,
and possibly the court was influenced by the mellowing effect of his advancing years. At any rate, the court disregarded the unanimous opinion of all Hospital and Commission
psychiatrists and ordered his discharge. This time he went
directly to Tennessee where, I am informed, he is engaged in
teaching school. In this instance, the psychiatrists' dire predictions were happily, but surprisingly, unfulfilled. The DeMarcos case is the exception which proves the rule.15
In the light of my previous comments, this story, in a way,
speaks for itself. Without belaboring some of the points made
already, a few additional remarks will be offered.
1. Inasmuch as DeMarcos was sufficiently intact to persevere,
as he did, in efforts to gain his release by appropriate legal
methods, one may well be skeptical about what kind of "insanity" he had suffered from. Perhaps his was a "case of true
paranoia," as claimed by the psychiatrists who saw him. But even
if the validity of this "diagnosis" is granted, it alone could not
explain or justify his interminable "hospitalization." This could
only be justified as serving the purposes of preventive jailing,
that is, imprisonment to prevent a future crime. I have discussed
in detail elsewhere the moral and legal illegitimacy of putting
psychiatric hospitalization to this use.' 6
14

Id. at 545.

Id.
Szasz, Recent Books on the Relation of Psychiatry to Criminology, 21
Psychiatry 307 (August 1958); Politics and Mental Health: Some Remarks
Apropos of the Case of Mr. Ezra Pound, 115 Am. J. Psychiat. 508 (December 1958).
15
16
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2. The present case also illustrates the extremely unequal
distribution of both power and (claims to) expert knowledge characteristic of these legal contests. All the power and expert
knowledge reside in the hands of the psychiatric authorities; the
patient is virtually helpless, even though he has the right to file
writs of habeas corpus and have legal representation. These are
necessary but insufficient safeguards for the preservation of the
rights of involuntary hospitalized mental patients.
3. Finally, I wish to call attention to a remark made by
Lebensohn. Although his paper is exceedingly interesting and
instructive, I feel it necessary to note that he considered DeMarcos' good conduct following his release from the hospital an
"exception which proves the rule." I submit that there is no
evidence for this statement and opinion. I am not implying that
there is evidence for the opposite contention, namely, that everyone who wants to get out of a mental hospital can "safely" be
released. The future is not easy to predict, and most of the time
we simply do not know what patients might or might not do. In
any case, my point is that it is the principle, and not merely the
practice, of preventive psychiatric jailing that should be questioned.
This paper was intended as a contribution to the study of
psychiatry, and especially institutional psychiatry, as a form of
social control. More specifically, I have sought to present further
evidence in support of the thesis that the relationship between
the involuntarily hospitalized mental patient and his psychiatrist (s) is commonly antagonistic rather than cooperative in
nature. This fact has received insufficient psychiatric, social and
legal attention. The conception of a "mental illness," as essentially similar to a bodily disease, serves to obscure the many exceedingly significant socio-economic, legal and ethical aspects of
forced mental hospitalization.
The patient's lawsuit for release, and the psychiatric superintendent's appeal that he be permitted to hold the patient despite a lower court's verdict to set him free, were examined as
paradigmatic of many contemporary problems in forensic psychiatry. Two suggestions were offered: first, that the frequent
adversary character of the physician-patient relationship in hospital psychiatry be more explicitly recognized; and second, that
there is a pressing need for more adequate legal as well as
psychiatric representation ("defense") for the involuntarily hospitalized mental patient.
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